Chipping away
Beijing has the advantage now in the Google row, but greater freedoms will come to China in the end

Jeffrey Garten
Jan 25, 2010           
     
      

  



Google's threat to withdraw from China is not the opening salvo in a battle between the future and the past. Rather, it is a battle between two equally plausible visions of the future with initial advantage on the side of China. Granted, that's not how most people in the West see it.

The gigantic internet search engine company is, after all, the epitome of technological innovation and communication across borders that can only benefit billions around the world. In attacking Google, China, on the other hand, comes across to many Americans and Europeans as King Canute, trying to hold back the tides of progress.

From Beijing, things look much different. To officials, the future may be about continuing to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, facilitating the rise of a rapidly growing middle class and providing a major boost to world trade. In their eyes, an uncontrolled internet may seem like a threat to national stability. Chinese officials no doubt look at the way America's financial system imploded, its deteriorating physical infrastructure, and its problem-plagued system of secondary education, and conclude that the West no longer has the standing to define where civilisation ought to be heading.

Google and China share certain characteristics, too. It was only in this past decade that Google burst on to the world scene with its gigantic initial public offering and China made its most far-reaching global commitments by joining the World Trade Organisation. Each is feared and even considered predatory - Google by many internet companies, China by certain segments of the US, European Union and countries in its backyard.

There is a strong case to be made that more globalisation, of the kind Google fosters, is inevitable. After all, for thousands of years, human beings have been in the process of connecting with one another across boundaries. That said, globalisation could be slowing down. The internationalisation of banking may experience some obstacles in the wake of the worldwide credit crisis. The recent fiasco in Copenhagen has set back prospects for serious cross-border co-operation on climate change. And global trade negotiations have been moribund for several years.

It has been an article of faith among most US leaders that economic engagement with China will slowly, but inexorably, bend its society towards Western values such as the rule of law and free expression. For almost three decades, the essence of that involvement has been penetration by international companies like Google. Multinationals have brought Western-style change in other parts of Asia - think about Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - so why not the Middle Kingdom?

Surely, so the reasoning also goes, all those Chinese employees of Western firms and all those Chinese students returning from US schools will exert a powerful Western influence. But, for centuries, the West has failed to make the kind of inroads it expected. The Middle Kingdom does incorporate foreign ideas, but in ways that suit its own needs, its own timing, and within the framework of its own culture and national priorities. What Yale historian Jonathan Spence wrote four decades ago about the efforts of Western advisers in China from 1625 to 1960 is still true: "China, which once surpassed the West, then almost succumbed, now offers to the world her own solutions."

The two visions of the future - openness, globalisation, Westernisation, on one hand, versus controls, nationalism, and far less Anglo-American influence, on the other - must be seen in the context of certain political realities that make China's perspective far more viable than most Westerners like to admit.

First, Washington's soaring debt and growing reliance on loans and investments from China, plus its need for Beijing's help on preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, ties its hands in providing high-profile support for one of its great companies, as it surely would have in the past. Many governments beholden to Beijing will probably hold their tongues: a number of them are cheering for Beijing.

Nor can Google expect very much support from other Western companies, almost none of which would risk their prospects in China's growing market.

Finally, compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the lustre and clout of Western multinationals have been vastly reduced, their reputations soiled by the Enrons and AIGs. Beyond that, emerging markets are producing their own corporate champions, which are providing ferocious competition to their developed-nation counterparts.

Hopefully, Google and China will find a way to settle amicably. For the foreseeable future, however, not only does Beijing hold all the cards, but it could actually reinforce its authority and enhance its standing among many countries of the world by humbling Google and warning all other multinationals against challenging its political power. Long term, which vision of the world will prevail? I'd say we'll end up with less openness and globalisation. Reason: in addition to China having the political winds in its sails, other issues such as concerns over privacy and the need to combat terrorist threats against critical cyber networks will slow the expansion of an open, unregulated internet.

Nevertheless, we will see more freedom than China is currently willing to allow. Ultimately, its tens of millions of tech-savvy inquisitive minds will have the ability and compulsion to scale any firewalls Chinese authorities erect. Many already do.

Jeffrey Garten is the Juan Trippe professor of international trade and finance at the Yale School of Management. He was formerly undersecretary of commerce for international trade in the first Clinton administration. Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online. (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu)


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Marines pull out of Iraq, but will it be for the last time?


IRAQ
Associated Press in Washington
Jan 26, 2010           
     
      

  



It is easily lost in the hopefulness of the US marines' departure from Iraq - hailed in ceremonies as "the final chapter" - that this is not the first time they left in the expectation of never returning.
Will it be the last?

In September 2003 the marines completed a pull-out from Iraq, leaving to the army the task of winding down the war, only to be called back in March 2004 amid a fast-boil insurgency centred in the western province of Anbar. The war, of course, was far from over, but few foresaw the scope of killing and chaos to come.

This time it is different. The insurgency is diminished and while Iraq's political turmoil could upset the timetable for the withdrawal of tens of thousands of American forces this year, it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which US President Barack Obama would respond by sending back the marines.

That's not to say Anbar - cradle of the Sunni insurgency that brought the country to the brink of civil war in 2006 - is entirely peaceful or that the security gains will not unravel.

Major General Rick Tryon, the marine commander who handed over responsibility for Anbar at a ceremony on Saturday in Ramadi, the provincial capital, struck a cautionary note. "There continues to be a lingering element bent on creating havoc," Tryon said.

Marines are well acquainted with havoc. It accompanied them into Iraq and then, for a while, took cover in an illusion of peacefulness. By the time of the marines' hurried return in March 2004 havoc was back. The following month was the marines' second deadliest month of the war: 51 killed. The worst was November 2004 with 80 combat deaths, mainly in a battle to drive al-Qaeda from the city of Fallujah.

The war had started well for the marines. In March 2003 they linked up with the army to capture Baghdad, break the regime of Saddam Hussein and begin what initially looked like a transition from combat to nation building. In late April they moved to south-central Iraq, a predominantly Shiite area that gave the appearance of moving towards peace.

The top marine commander in Iraq at the time, Lieutenant General James Conway, noted in September 2003 as the last of his troops headed home that he had not lost a single soldier to hostile fire in the five months they had been operating in south-central cities such as Karbala, Najaf and Hillah.

"We went in with an attitude that the war was over," Conway said. His point: the focus was on helping the Iraqis get back on their feet and on training their police. Marines used force only when attacked.

He had a colourful way of illustrating the welcoming atmosphere in which his marines were operating. "Little kids run a quarter mile on a hot pavement with bare feet to wave."

Former marine Bing West, in his account of the war, The Strongest Tribe, writes that the south-central region was so hospitable in the summer of 2003 that the Karbala city council tried to elect a marine lieutenant colonel its mayor.

But in Anbar trouble was brewing - even as the top army commander in that area insisted he had found the key to success. Major General Chuck Swannack said on November 18, 2003, that he was aware of a need to win hearts and minds but his soldiers were going to hit and hit hard.

He said he was following the advice of a British general in the second world war: "Use a sledgehammer to crush a walnut."

And he had this to say about the state of affairs that autumn in Fallujah, the epicentre of an insurgency not yet fully understood by the Americans: "The good news is Fallujah has become quite quiet in recent days."

A little less than three months later, Swannack was accompanying General John Abizaid, the top US commander for the Middle East, to visit an Iraqi civil defence battalion headquarters in Fallujah when insurgents ambushed them, spraying gunfire but missing their mark.

Swannack's troops left in March, replaced by the marines with Conway once again in command. The insurgency grew more deadly.

Years of hard fighting followed, with the low point for the marines arguably coming in August 2006. Early that month in Fallujah, the top marine intelligence officer in Anbar, Colonel Pete Devlin, delivered a sobering message: al-Qaeda was gaining strength and prospects for winning the war, at least in Anbar, were dim.

In the weeks that followed, however, the so-called Anbar Awakening, led by tribal leaders fed up with al-Qaeda, took hold. Sunni tribes took security into their own hands, helping the Americans.

In April 2007, Conway said: "We have turned the corner."

He was proved correct and almost three years later his marines are finished with Iraq - or so they hope.


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Growing pains
Beijing should realise that Hong Kong's troubles are not so unusual for an advanced society

Anthony Cheung
Jan 27, 2010           
     
      

  



Hong Kong has never been easy to govern. First, the system of governance is inherited from the colonial days and is proving increasingly dysfunctional in the new political landscape. And, since reunification, there has been a growing distrust of the government, whose policy decisions are often suspected of favouring big business and doing Beijing's bidding.

Now comes a new social movement whose issues such as local identity and the politics of planning and the environment have displaced the old politics of welfare. Influenced by the global sustainability movement, and reinforced by many Hongkongers' worries about undue influence from the mainland, the rules of political engagement are being rewritten. When these three forces coalesce, the conditions are ripe for political implosion, as marked by the express rail-link saga.

Much can be said about how public consultation could have been done better on this and other issues. Deeply rooted structural problems - such as the lack of democratic progress, economic uncertainty and reduced social mobility - no doubt complicate matters. There are no simple solutions. Even mature democracies face demands for greater empowerment or rising discontent among the middle class.

Hong Kong faces even greater dilemmas. It is not an independent polity but has to negotiate its constitutional change with the central government. If not interpreted innovatively, the Basic Law could become a political straitjacket, as Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew remarked in 1998.

Hong Kong can't afford stagnation in economic growth or infrastructure development. Without expanding the economic pie, there is no way to create new opportunities for social mobility. Without integration with the mainland, our following generations will miss out on a "new horizon" of the 21st century that young people the world over hanker to explore and exploit.

Yet there is no small measure of scepticism about the distribution of economic fruits under a political system that many regard as unfair. The government either gets blamed for not acting, or for acting with doubtful intentions. People know the city's destiny cannot be separated from that of China as a whole, but they worry about losing its distinctiveness in the name of integration.

Policy debates are often clouded by larger political uneasiness and, once moral politics take over, the key question becomes: "Which side are you on?" The result is a society that fails to listen to itself and to the many views that give Hong Kong its sophistication and vibrancy.

Few major infrastructure projects in other big cities have escaped controversy - from the building of the Sydney Opera House in the 1960s to the continuing division over extending London's Heathrow Airport. Policy choices are seldom non-controversial, so policymakers must listen carefully. But, eventually, they must make the "best" choice in the circumstances.

Hong Kong needs not only democracy but also tolerance and the capacity to manage differences. As a political system, democracy works by finding compromises among conflicting interests and views, where there are not always absolute rights or wrongs. Whenever the government gets its arguments or arithmetic wrong, we don't want it to think it does not have to fully justify itself because it enjoys a guaranteed majority. Conversely, we do not want officials with a valid point of view to be ignored or discredited simply because they are part of the establishment.

Hong Kong's problems today are the ones that China's other cities will face tomorrow, when its better-educated and informed children grow up to be more independent-minded and critical, when tensions between economic growth and equity, between the new rich and newly poor, and between nation building and local identity become more acute as the country reaches a higher, but steady, stage of development.

Hong Kong should strive for more balanced development and responsive governance and national leaders should see Hong Kong's problems as normal for any advanced society, rather than as signs of a breakdown.

In this way Hong Kong can actually provide good lessons for Beijing on how to manage an emerging urbanised middle class who care about the values and quality of life as much as about material wealth and consumption.

Anthony Cheung Bing-leung is an executive councillor and founder of SynergyNet, a policy think tank


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Wake up and face the reality of a city in turmoil


C.P. Ho
Jan 28, 2010           
     
      

  



The past few weeks have demonstrated the dire straits Hong Kong is in, with fierce criticism ranging from poor governance and big business cronyism to economic ills and a widening rich-poor divide.

There is nothing worse than forgetting reality. Yet, that is what often happens when people are faced with the hard facts of life; they migrate to never-never land.

Only a very few are able to keep things in perspective, and the majority does not want to "get real".

And so it is in Hong Kong. Now, more than ever, is the time for all good men and women to come to the aid of a beleaguered city endangered by battles of social, economic and political wills.

Of course, it takes courage, wisdom and determination to face up to the facts. But we also have to get real at this critical juncture.

This city has passed - with flying colours and worldwide acknowledgment - two tough tests in its passage to becoming part of China.

The first was the post-Tiananmen phase. Still a British colony in 1989, the government under governor David Wilson allowed, for the first time in the city's history, tens of thousands of people onto the streets to demonstrate against the June 4 killings. Protests and rallies have followed and, to this day, the annual candle-light vigil in Victoria Park is permitted and well-attended.

Wilson's decision was a radical departure from the British government's long-held stance that Hong Kong people did not like to be involved in anything vaguely political. His successor, Chris Patten, tried to hasten the pace of democracy and Hong Kong people, until quite recently, did not force it.

Indeed, Hong Kong people kept their cool and the city has now become one of the most democratic places in China - and, for the matter, in the world.

The second test came, of course, on July 1, 1997 - the handover. There was much apprehension, demonstrated in part by an exodus of people and capital to foreign shores. But the "one country, two systems" formula has worked, and the people and the money have returned.

Times change, however, and Hong Kong cannot afford a further disconnect between the government and the governed. The administration has got to be seen to care - and that doesn't only mean sending top officials to the scene of a disaster. It has to anticipate discontent and deal with it. To do that requires having its finger on the public pulse at all times.

Colloquially, the Legislative Council is known as the "garbage meeting", which says a lot about what the man in the street thinks of the standard of speeches there and the antics of some legislators.

Now, Hong Kong is facing its third test - and the people must be ready. Five legislators from the Civic Party and the League of Social Democrats gave up their seats yesterday, and these will be contested in by-elections. In this way, they have created what the dissenting legislators consider to be a "referendum" on electoral reform in Hong Kong.

The reality is that Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China. It has its own mini-constitution, which is subject to interpretation by the National People's Congress Standing Committee.

The word "referendum" constitutes a direct challenge to the authority of the central government. It breaks no Hong Kong law but the SAR is not a sovereign state, so is not empowered to carry out a referendum unless sanctioned by Beijing.

Why is this third test so critical for Hong Kong's future? Because the central government puts stability above all else and sees any tampering with its stance on Hong Kong's political system as not conducive to constitutional progress, or to political and economic development.

What action it will take remains to be seen. But there is a sense of foreboding. And that is the reality.

C.P. Ho, a former news agency correspondent and television executive, writes occasional articles for newspapers and magazines


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Losers all round
A lack of common sense on all sides means no winners will emerge from the by-elections fiasco

Stephen Vines
Jan 29, 2010           
     
      

  



It is almost unknown for a political crisis to leave all those involved worse off than before it began. Generally what happens is that someone emerges as a winner, while others are relegated to loser status. But this is most unlikely to happen in Hong Kong as a result of the resignation of five legislators, the impasse over constitutional reform and growing civil discontent.

The League of Social Democrats and the Civic Party were motivated to launch the referendum strategy out of sheer exasperation with the snail's pace of constitutional reform. Their logic was to force a referendum by holding by-elections in all the geographical constituencies to give the public an opportunity to express their views on democracy. Because they acted in a state of exasperation, they failed to appreciate the insurmountable difficulties of creating a referendum in conditions where they had no control over the rules of the game and no hope that their opponents would passively go along with the plan.

This strategy has split the democratic camp and produced acute tensions within the Democratic Party, which decided not to support the referendum plan. It is therefore highly likely that the result will prove to be a setback for the democratic movement.

But, on the other side of the fence, the anti-democrats have acted with equal haste and stupidity. Instead of cleverly using the by-elections to increase their presence in the legislature, they have allowed the mask to drop from the pretence of favouring democratic reform, albeit at a pace dictated by Beijing.

They really want no reform and no opportunity for open debate, to the extent of walking out of the Legislative Council to prevent those resigning from making a statement. Some are trying to block funding for the elections while others have gone so far as to initiate legislation that would ban resigned legislators from ever re-entering the chamber; a ban that does not even extend to convicted criminals who have been readmitted on release from prison.

Moreover, the anti-democrats have laid bare to whom they are accountable. A couple of brisk phone calls from Chinese officials was all it took for the Liberal Party to abandon its categorical pledge to contest these by-elections. The infinitely smarter and better organised Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong is likely to follow suit, under pressure from Beijing, even though the party stood every chance of doing very well in the by-elections.

Instead, it is likely to demonstrate that, when it comes to a choice between putting its case to the people or taking orders from the mainland, it will tremble and obey.

It might be imagined that, in these circumstances, the Hong Kong government would be sitting back reaping the reward from the malaise among the political parties. Any bureaucrat who thinks this way is seriously deluded because what this whole farrago demonstrates is their growing irrelevance in the political process. Even their so-called allies go directly to Beijing without even pausing for a pit stop at the Central Government Offices.

The democrats, meanwhile, did not even bother to go there on January 1 for the pro-democracy mobilisation but went straight to the central government's liaison office.

While seemingly unaware of their impotence, officials have employed a worrying level of hysterical rhetoric in this matter, throwing around charges of revolution and threats to civil order, and thus placing a question mark over their judgment.

The net result of all this is to steer Hong Kong into uncharted waters, where both the government and the established political parties are weakened as a vacuum emerges.

It may be argued that this vacuum will simply be filled by the government in Beijing. If this is so, we can say goodbye to the concept of "one country, two systems".

Another possibility is that new political forces will emerge to fill the void; however, it is hardly axiomatic that something new will be something better.

Shrewd political operators know never to get into a situation where the way out is not evident.

The fact that this piece of common sense has been ignored in Hong Kong may have something to do with the immaturity of the political system.

Stephen Vines is a Hong Kong-based journalist and entrepreneur


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Dumb and dumber
Hong Kong politics is taking on a surreal air as a disaster unfolds before our eyes

Mike Rowse
Feb 01, 2010           
     
      

  



It's like one of those nightmares you have as a child, where you wake up sweating and calling out for Mum. Two trains are moving in slow motion towards a deadly collision. You know the result will be a disaster, but you feel powerless to prevent it. Coming from one direction we have the train carrying the woefully inadequate reform proposals from the government. By maintaining corporate voting and small-circle functional constituency elections, the consultation exercise began as a farce.

And, from the opposite direction, comes the train carrying the equally farcical idea of the League of Social Democrats and Civic Party coalition for a "referendum".

What gave rise to this nightmare and how can we prevent it from turning into reality? We should begin with the consultation paper published by the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau in November. We should be fair and note that it does propose improvements in several areas. One example is the increase in membership of the Electoral College which will choose the next chief executive, and providing that all of the additional members will be elected in a more democratic way.

But the most important issue that needed to be addressed has been ducked completely. Some time before 2020, the community needs to decide whether to scrap functional constituencies altogether or make very substantial changes in the way elections for them are held.

And, whatever the final decision, we need to make a start now by abolishing corporate voting immediately and setting a minimum number of human voters in each of the functional constituencies. This number could be increased for the 2016 elections. Then by 2018, when we need to bite the bullet for 2020, we would have a more representative legislature to reach a consensus and implement it. Failure to start now would mean some of the later steps would simply be too big.

It is inconceivable that, today, private companies could still be choosing some of our legislators and others could be chosen in small-circle elections. There is not a single good argument for corporate voting to be retained. The consultation paper says that scrapping the system would be "too complicated". Such a remark is an insult to the intelligence of Hong Kong people.

With the government having got off to such a poor start, the way was open for the pro-democracy camp to give the official side a thorough thrashing in public debate. But, just to prove it's always possible to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, the league and Civic Party camp came up with the idea of demanding direct elections for both the chief executive and all Legislative Council seats in 2012, and the immediate abolition of functional constituencies. And, to force home the point, they are implementing their by-election-cum-referendum plan.

There are so many things wrong with this proposed package that it is difficult to know where to begin. For one, we already know that Hong Kong people favour democracy by a wide margin, so we don't need expensive by-elections to prove it. For another, Beijing - whose consent to the changes is required - has already ruled that 2017 and 2020 are the magic dates and, for 2012, the functional constituencies must stay. What possible use is it to run for re-election on a manifesto that is impossible to implement? And by no stretch of the imagination do the by-elections count as a referendum.

So far, so bad. But further developments have seen us edge towards the abyss. In a strange reprise of Dumb and Dumber, pro-Beijing spokesmen scored two own goals with one shot by coming out to say that resigning to stage a referendum was illegal, thereby giving a status to the by-elections that they do not deserve.

The Liberal Party came out first with the right idea - a boycott of the whole silly exercise. As this countermeasure began to gain traction, the coalition responded by saying it would, if necessary, put up two of its own candidates in each constituency to ensure there had to be a vote. How would they be able, ever again, to criticise proposed government expenditure if they engineered such a colossal waste of public funds?

The real danger in all this is that we risk a repeat of 2005. Then, the government and democratic camp got so close to a deal, but both backed off at the last minute. Another failure to make progress would be a disaster for Hong Kong.

Can anyone save us? Just possibly, but it is going to take statesmanship and common sense, two commodities in short supply up to now.

Since the Democratic Party itself has so far had the good sense to stay above the fray, it has retained the moral high ground. It can now set out clearly, behind the scenes initially and in public later, minimum improvements to the government proposals that it will accept in return for reluctant support of the package. And the government will have to be prepared to compromise.

Mike Rowse is a retired civil servant and an adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong


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The people's will
Public sentiment can play a dangerous role in mainland justice

Jerome A. Cohen and Oliver Zhong
Feb 03, 2010           
     
      

  



Interaction among courts, the media and public opinion is complex in every free country. The internet magnifies the complexity. Even mainland China, despite strict government controls, cannot escape it, as last summer's famous Deng Yujiao case demonstrated. Months after she fatally stabbed a government official, and a trial that roiled the nation, this young cause celebre now lives an anonymous life far from home. Once seen by a wildly supportive public as a hapless folk heroine who resisted outrageous abuse, Deng now hopes to be forgotten.

Yet, for the mainland's legal reform, it is too soon to turn the page. Recently revealed details of the case illuminate how justice was meted out.

On the night of May 10, in a hotel massage parlour in Badong county, Hubei province, two officials scuffled with Deng, who worked there. She stabbed both men with a fruit knife, killing one.

The case initially seemed to be an ordinary local tragedy. Within days, however, it turned into a nationwide phenomenon, once internet reports suggested that the men had demanded "special services" from Deng, hit her face with wads of cash and pinned her down on a sofa. An area TV station broadcast incendiary video footage of Deng claiming to have been beaten. By the time Deng's publicity minded Beijing lawyer made teary-eyed public appeals for justice, most Chinese internet users seemed convinced she had acted in self-defence and should not be prosecuted.

Seeking to prevent this media-driven scandal from stimulating mass protests, the authorities cut off all road and water travel to Badong and scoured hotels in the area for out-of-town journalists. Top Hubei officials took over all public communications and, after official pressure, Deng's mother dismissed her bold, media-savvy lawyer. The case had become what the all-powerful Communist Party Central Political-Legal Committee later called a "pan-political incident".

Amid continuing popular outrage against Deng's abusers, any thought of treating the matter as intentional homicide had long since vanished. Yet the idea of a not-guilty verdict on the grounds of self-defence, in a case where an official had been killed, was apparently intolerable to party leaders, who found it difficult enough to persuade the deceased's family to withdraw its claim for damages against the defendant. Traditional sympathy for a woman protecting her virtue had to be vindicated, but killing of an official had to be condemned.

The party soon engineered a typical mainland judicial compromise. Deng was convicted for excessive self-defence constituting aggravated assault resulting in death. But the court spared her from any punishment, even a suspended sentence. It attributed its leniency to three mitigating factors. Deng had "voluntarily" surrendered, she had been provoked by the victims' misconduct, and she was suffering from psychiatrically verified mental illness.

The online community hailed the decision as a victory for "the people's will". Yet, late last month, in a detailed investigative report, Guangzhou's reformist Southern Metropolitan Daily raised serious questions about whether public opinion had been misled and allowed to distort handling of this case. Hadn't the victims only demanded a "bath", rather than sexual intercourse, and wasn't the "sofa" actually a seat too small for pinning Deng down? Weren't the alleged mitigating factors insufficient to justify her freedom? How could her use of deadly force go unpunished?

When asked about these doubts, a local judge reportedly confided that the decision was made at a very high level and the court was merely there to "read it out". Not surprisingly, this confirmed not only the lack of independence of mainland judges in non-routine cases but also the readiness of party leaders to base their instructions, at least in part, on their perception of public opinion.

Yet, in high-profile cases that reach the trial stage, these factors usually operate against the defendant. In the recent Akmal Shaikh drug-smuggling case and in the notorious Yang Jia cop-killer case, for example, popular demands for execution overwhelmed voices opposing official refusals to give obviously disturbed defendants the thorough psychiatric examination Deng received. In the infamous Liu Yong case, the Shenyang gang leader was sent to his death by popular demand even though his conviction was, importantly, based on a confession admittedly extracted through torture.

In Deng's case, by contrast, popular outcry forced the hand of a leadership obsessed with "stability" to free someone, illustrating that, as a social safety valve, the party must also respond to public pressures for leniency.

Ad hoc political responsiveness to mass demands for justice is a dangerous game, and surely inconsistent with the rule of law. In criminal cases, democratic countries - most recently Japan - reconcile popular views with the rule of law through juries and other forms of citizen participation in an independent judicial process.

In mainland courts, restrictions on both the long-standing use of "people's assessors" and recent efforts to consult informal "juries" inhibit popular trust in criminal justice. Moreover, manipulation of the media and internet, whether by the government or the defence, often makes it difficult even to identify the authentic will of the people.

Professor Jerome A. Cohen is co-director of NYU School of Law's US-Asia Law Institute and adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Oliver Zhong is research fellow of the institute.


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Canny Canucks


ALEX LO

Feb 04, 2010           
     
      

  



I am a cultural opportunist. China's ascendancy has made me a proud Chinese, if not a rabid nationalist, yet. Accounts of the nation's achievements turn my eyes watery. But, lately, I feel like a proud Canadian, too. (Disclosure: my family emigrated from here to Canada when I was in my teens.) Canada and Canadians rarely get the recognition they deserve. But they are getting it now. Volumes of ink have been spilled over how China emerged triumphant from the global financial meltdown. That was before the potentially detrimental consequences of its loose monetary and currency policies became apparent. Now even Beijing admits there are dangers ahead.

But lately, quiet, dull and unexciting Canada has been getting its dues. The fact that, of all the Group of Seven nations, Canada is the only economy that didn't have to bail out its financial sector is surely something worth pondering seriously. Surviving this perfect financial storm was no mean feat. Somehow my own investment portfolio mimics the differing fortunes of the US and Canada. My Citigroup shares were practically zero when I bid good riddance to them whereas my Canadian bank shares held up remarkably well. Why that was so was brought home to me in an excellent article over the weekend by the Financial Times' managing editor in the US, Chrystia Freeland, a fellow Canadian.

I bet Paul Krugman read it too because The New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist covered essentially the same grounds as Freeland in his latest opinion article. But where they differ is this: Krugman thinks Canada succeeded not because of its culture but due to the way its financial institutions are set up; Freeland thinks culture determines the way Canadian institutions are built and operate. This is, of course, an old and endless chicken-or-egg-first dispute over the priority of institution and culture. But, as a Canadian, I am with Freeland.

The distinctly Canadian characteristics that go into determining its financial regulations and institutions have made them far more robust to shocks than the more flashy British-American systems. A culture of restraint and common sense, along with an absence of the pernicious ideology of free markets, deregulation and financial innovation, mean they have no qualms about government intervention and tough regulation.

Canadians value law and order, something enshrined in their constitution. That's why it was easy to push back pressure to deregulate when that was in vogue around the world. The whole Canadian system has been designed to take away the punch bowl before the party gets too out of control. Canadians value equality, fairness and social safety nets. Their society is poles apart from the winner-takes-all ethos characteristic of US business. Like the Japanese counterparts, they simply would not tolerate the kind of ludicrous pay and bonuses American bankers and chief executive officers give themselves.

Canadian banks are required to put up much higher capital reserves and much higher quality equities within those reserves. Excessive leverage is discouraged. A simple but effective and well-co-ordinated financial services regulatory system also trumps the piecemeal system in the US, which is deliberately set up to create gaping loopholes for financial services companies to exploit. Like Hong Kong, Canadian homebuyers have to put in a high down payment, ensuring a high equity-to-loan ratio. Interest-only mortgages are unheard of. Unlike Hong Kong, most Canadian mortgages are fixed rate, rather than variable. The low level of securitisation of mortgages ensures Canadian banks did not have the kind of exposure to debts-based derivatives that burned big holes in the balance sheets of so many US banks.

Canadians today are not mired in the torturous and acrimonious debates in the US and the European Union about how to reform their systems and rein in their arrogantly destructive bankers and financiers; or the increasingly heated disputes over China's undervalued yuan. From that perspective, you start to appreciate the hard-earned and well-deserved tranquility of the Great White North.

Alex Lo is a senior writer at the Post. alex.lo@scmp.com


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New silk roads to the Middle Kingdom


John Lee
Feb 05, 2010           
     
      

  



Towards the end of the second world war, the godfather of geopolitics, Nicholas Spykman, offered his famous analysis that was to become a rule of thumb for many strategists: who controls the "Rimland" rules Eurasia, and who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. In this "Asian Century", Eurasia is dismissed as having lost its importance after the cold war. But China sees Central Asia in a new light and is hoping this could lead to a geopolitical reorganisation of "Asia" itself.

There are two proud itinerant traditions in Chinese history that did much to extend the reach of its civilisation, trade and the tributary system. The first is the seafaring one best exemplified by Admiral Zheng He leading the Ming dynasty's immense armada on seven epic voyages to Indonesia, India, Africa and even Arabia six centuries ago.

The second is China's large role in developing the land-based Old Silk Road that connected East, South and Central Asia with Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

When we view modern China it is He's seafaring tradition that we warily respect and perhaps fear. China has the most ambitious and fastest growing submarine- and ship-building programme in the world. Its emphasis on extending its influence in East and Southeast Asia - especially through its maritime presence - is predictable. After all, its great strategic vulnerability is reliance on energy imports by sea.

But although geography is permanent, geostrategy is not. China is seeking to change the geostrategic parameters of the existing game for influence in Asia. For most geostrategists, Central Asia is mostly irrelevant because it lacks clout and is characterised by an apparent strategic emptiness. But this presents new opportunities for China to rebuild its own influence.

While attention is focused on the naval rivalry in East and Southeast Asia, China has been using a "new silk road' strategy that it hopes will reshape geostrategy in Asia. First, it is attempting to build a hub-and spoke system via the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia who are building strategic, economic and diplomatic ties with China rather than separate ones with each other.

Second, Old Silk Road routes offer China the prospect of growing relief from reliance on sea-based energy imports. For example, there are pipelines linking Kazakhstan to Chinese refineries. And gas pipelines stretch from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to China.

Third, if Central Asia experiences an economic renaissance via energy resources, Beijing has plans to be the future hub between Central Asian states and those in East and Southeast Asia.

There are inherent limitations to even the best-laid plans. Even so, it makes sense for China to broaden the geostrategic construction of "Asia" to include Central Asia. By creating a second, land-based centre of strategic importance, it is well placed to dilute the traditional geostrategic order based on control of the seas in Asia.

Dr John Lee is the Foreign Policy Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and author of Will China Fail? Copyright: OpinionAsia


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World of opportunity
China's new status as the leader in exports reflects the virtues of global trade

Daniel Ikenson and Alec van Gelder
Feb 08, 2010           
     
      

  



To protectionists and Sinophobes, China overtaking Germany last year to become the world's largest exporter heralds a new, unwelcome global order. But, more than a reflection of China's growing economic might, it is testament to the erosion of economic, political, physical and technological barriers to production.

China's success is because of multilateral trade with the rest of the world, despite what the anti-China lobbies in Brussels, New Delhi and Washington argue. So, when US President Barack Obama and lawmakers complain about China, they forget that Chinese exports include American exports.

Beginning with widespread liberalisation of trade and investment rules after the second world war, barriers have been falling and incomes rising around the world.

China's opening to the West in 1978; the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and of the Soviet Union two years later; the collapse of communism as a model for developing countries; the advent and proliferation of containerised shipping; GPS technology; just-in-time supply; and other marvels of the information, transport and communications revolutions have spawned a global division of labour and production that defies traditional analysis. This makes trade-flow accounting highly misleading.

Global economics is no longer a competition between "us and them", between "our" producers and "their" producers. Instead, because of cross-border investment and transnational production and supply chains, the factory has broken down its walls and now spans borders and oceans. Competition is often between international brands or production and supply chains that defy national identity.

So, what does all of this have to do with China's status as the world's biggest exporter? Like Hong Kong, which blazed the way for living off international trade, the vast majority of mainland Chinese exports are hugely dependent on imports from the rest of the world: iron ore from Australia; microchips from Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore; software from teams in Redmond (Washington State) and Bangalore; new designs from Cambridge (Massachusetts or England) and Toulouse; investments raised from consortiums based in New York City, Sao Paulo or Johannesburg.

China has become the world's largest exporter primarily because of the global division of labour that has helped reduce poverty and create wealth: China provides lower-value-added production. The components of Apple's iPods and iPhones are put together in China, but their designers in California are worth more to the company's bottom line. Denmark's Ecco has shoe factories across Asia, but their most valuable footwear is still designed and manufactured in Europe, where the quality is guaranteed and the workforce is highly trained - and higher paid.

China has not become a key figure in global trade by accident. It has capitalised on the new reality of global production and supply chains: since 1983, it has unilaterally removed barriers to trade, realising they were primarily harming China. True, China's trade policies remain far from perfect. But they have liberalised quickly and considerably, which helps explain China's prominent role in global production and supply.

Calculating who earns the biggest amount from exports remains a problem. Intermediate goods are shipped to mainland China from places such as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia and the US, snapped together (or perhaps a slightly higher value-added operation), then exported.

As those goods leave the ports of Shanghai, Tianjin or Guangdong for export, simple trade-accounting rules attribute the total value of those exports to China, even when the Chinese value embedded in those goods accounts for a small fraction.

That accounting method helps explain why China's exports have surged over the decades, as the division of labour evolved and manufacturing chains proliferated.

A recent study by economists at the University of California concludes that the Chinese value-added embedded in a 30 gigabyte Apple iPod accounts for only US$4 of the total US$150 cost, yet the entire US$150 is chalked up as a Chinese export.

Other studies estimate overall Chinese value-added in all products exported from China to average somewhere between 35 and 50 per cent, a big proportion but a lot less than gross export figures imply.

Indeed, "if China grows, this pushes the world's economy - and that's good for export-oriented Germany as well", Volker Treier, a German Chamber of Industry and Commerce economist, said recently.

As we consider China's new status as global export leader, it is important to understand what it means. This data speaks much more convincingly of the virtues of economic interdependence than of China's standalone export prowess: it presents opportunities for everyone to join the global economy.

Daniel Ikenson is associate director of the Cato Institute's Centre for Trade Policy Studies and author of No Longer Us vs. Them. Alec van Gelder is a project director at International Policy Network


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Incineration should no longer be a dirty word


Timothy Peirson-Smith
Feb 09, 2010           
     
      

  



Hong Kong, like many cities worldwide, has a troubled historic relationship with incineration as a waste management option. A 1989 white paper published by the government identified the incineration of solid waste as a key contributor to air pollution and decided to cease the practice for good, leading to the closure of the four local incineration plants between 1991 and 1997.

With this legacy and baggage, coupled with viable concerns over air pollution in a high-rise city, the community understandably is hostile to the incineration concept. It was not until 2008 that incineration re-emerged as the preferred approach but, after so many years of stigma, the government faces an uphill struggle to get it accepted.

The situation today is different elsewhere. During an environmental tour to Japan last October, arranged by several industry groups including the Hong Kong Waste Management Association, I was astounded by the quality and extensive use of incineration technology for waste management. Technology has advanced such that modern incineration constitutes a state-of-the-art, hi-tech, clean and sustainable waste management solution, much different from the dirty, smelly, smoke-belching incinerators of the 1990s.

Japanese companies are designing and building plants that incinerate waste at a much higher temperature, with negligible levels of emitted pollutants, including dioxins.

Bearing in mind these dramatic advances, negative perceptions regarding incineration are no longer as pertinent as they once were. In this context, the government is right to recognise incineration as a key strategy in the fight to stave off an impending waste management crisis - as it has with recent proposals for integrated waste management facilities. In terms of environmental sustainability, the concept represents a welcome step away from the expansion of landfills as Hong Kong's sole waste management strategy - one that has begun to display dangerous tendencies. The recently approved expansion of the Southeast New Territories landfill into a section of Clear Water Bay Country Park, for example, is a travesty.

When deciding the details of the integrated facilities, environmental and social sustainability must be key. To be sustainable, incineration should satisfy three conditions. First, any plant built in Hong Kong must be a "waste-to-energy" facility, whereby heat and/or electricity are supplied back to the surrounding community either at a discount or free. Second, the facilities must be a community asset with a recognised civic role. Third, the facilities need not be an industrial eyesore. In Japan, incinerators are often architecturally outstanding contributions to the skyline.

All of Tokyo's non-recyclable waste has been incinerated since 1996. With limited space and a need to protect our country parks, Hong Kong has a lot to learn. We must now further educate the public and nurture their acceptance of incineration as a safe, sustainable and effective solution for non-recyclable waste.

Habits must also be transformed to counteract the very "wet" nature of our waste, which makes the process less efficient. Importantly, the public must be encouraged to recognise that incineration of non-recyclable or residual waste - the fourth "R" - is only part of the solution, and embrace the "three Rs" of "reduce", "reuse" and "recycle".

Some have argued for another "R" to be added: "responsibility". We are part of the problem, and we are part of the solution. Through education, increased awareness and a willingness to follow the high standards of nations such as Japan, the integrated waste management facilities could be just one element of a truly sustainable waste management revolution.

Timothy J. Peirson-Smith is managing director of Executive Counsel Limited, a sustainability-focused public affairs and strategic communication consultancy based in Hong Kong. He is also chairman of the Business Policy Unit, British Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong


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Activists seek to elude Iran's internet police


IRAN
Reuters in Tehran
Feb 10, 2010           
     
      

  



With their paths through the internet increasingly blocked by government filters, Nooshin and her fellow Iranian opposition-supporters say their information on planned protests now comes in e-mails. They say they do not know who sends them.

Internet messages have been circulating about possible rallies tomorrow, when Iran marks the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution. But the climate in the Islamic republic is much harder than before last year's post-election protests.

In June last year, social media sites were hailed in the West as promising opposition supporters an anonymous rallying ground - especially when they were accessed through proxy servers that could mask participants' actions and whereabouts.

For determined Iranians now, they are a high-risk tactic in a strategic game with the authorities, amid reports of mounting internet disruption. Almost 32 per cent of Iranians use the internet and nearly 59 per cent have a cellphone subscription, 2008 estimates from the International Telecommunications Union show.

Since the disputed presidential poll that plunged Iran into its deepest internal turmoil since the 1979 revolution, the authorities have slowed internet speeds and shut opposition websites. They also boast of an ability to track online action even from behind the proxies.

"This one is also blocked," sighed Nooshin, a student, as she surfed the Web in a cafe in Tehran. "This is more filternet than internet."

Speaking in a low voice and wearing a blue headscarf, the 22-year-old declined to use her real name due to the sensitivity of opposition activism.

The presidential vote was followed by huge protests led by opposition supporters who say the poll was rigged to secure hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election. The authorities deny that charge.

When their newspapers were shut down after the vote, defeated presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi launched their own websites. The authorities later blocked them, forcing the opposition to set up new ones.

Much of this action and protest was publicised and tracked on the internet, especially through micro-blogging site Twitter. However, concerns are now mounting in Iran that the authorities may be able to track down people who use proxies.

"People are afraid of being identified and are not willing to use them any longer," said Hamid, a shopkeeper in Markaz-e Computre, a popular computer shopping mall in Tehran.

Which is not to say opposition efforts to plan and publicise action have been thwarted. Afshin, a Web developer who supports the opposition, said the authorities would not succeed: "Whatever the government blocks on the Web, the people find another way. It is a cat-and-mouse game the government cannot win."

Arrayed against the Web activists is the fact the government has the latest monitoring technology, enabling it to detect computers making a secure connection, said Mikko Hypponen, the chief research officer for Helsinki-based F-Secure Corporation.

Some proxy servers use secure sockets layer (SSL) to secure the connection with a remote server. This security layer helps ensure no other computers can read the traffic.

When people make SSL connections - used in the West for internet shopping - the authorities cannot see the content of material accessed. But they can physically raid sites to check on the computers involved.

National police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam last month warned Iran's opposition against using text messages and e-mails to organise fresh street rallies.

"These people should know where they are sending the SMS and e-mail as these systems are under control. They should not think using proxies will prevent their identification," he said. "If they continue ... those who organise or issue appeals [about opposition protests] have committed a crime worse than those who take to the streets."

Thousands of people were arrested during widespread street unrest after the election. Most have been freed, but more than 80 have been jailed for up to 15 years, including several senior opposition figures. On January 28, Iranian media said two men sentenced to death in trials that followed the election had been executed. Tension rose after eight people were killed in clashes with security forces in December, including Mousavi's nephew.

"The security services can turn technology against the logistics of protest," Evgeny Morozov, a commentator on the political implications of the internet, wrote in the November edition of Prospect magazine, citing experiences in Belarus and elsewhere.

But the authorities are facing determined resistance. Journalists inside Iran have been banned from attending opposition demonstrations, but that has not kept footage of anti-government gatherings from reaching the internet.

"It is extremely important for me to check my e-mail messages in order to be informed about the latest developments in the absence of independent free media in the country," said Nooshin, her computer screen repeatedly flashing up the same message in Farsi: "Access to this page is prohibited by the law."

A young customer in the computer shopping centre in Tehran said: "It is very important to be unidentified while surfing the internet these days ... the most secure way for us is to have a secure e-mail account."


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The great power game
Portraits of China's rise and America's decline in the region fail to capture the real dynamics at play

Brad Glosserman
Feb 11, 2010           
     
      

  



The hearts of Asia-Pacific strategists are all a flutter. The desire of Japan's new government to "rebalance" its foreign policy between East and West and the tensions between Tokyo and Washington that have followed in its wake are seen as portents of a shift in the regional balance of power. Propelled by a global recession that is widely seen as "made in the USA" and the striking contrast posed by China's resilience and rising confidence, there is a growing sense that we are witnesses to the first stages in a fundamental transition in the way the world works.

This is a compelling portrait - but it is simplistic and the implications that many draw from the changes under way are way overdrawn. This is crude zero-sum thinking, and it doesn't capture the dynamics of contemporary Asia.

The case for change is straightforward. The Obama administration talks about a new commitment to Asia, but it is distracted by wars elsewhere and absorbed by bruising political fights at home. Its capacity for action is limited by rising debt and its dependence on other nations whose interests often differ from those of the US or who prefer to see Washington humbled, if not humiliated, by foreign adversaries. The chief beneficiary of these constraints is China, which is eager to resume its place of prominence in Asia and whose economic dynamism has put itself at the very heart of a more deeply integrated regional order. China's appeal is increasing - and, when seduction doesn't work, Beijing has shown little compunction about playing hardball to get its way.

The canary in this coalmine is Tokyo. New Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has said that he seeks to "rebalance" relations with its ally and forge a new relationship with Asia as a whole and China in particular. The "meaning" of this shift is reputedly evident in rising tensions with Washington triggered by delays in the planned move of the marine air base at Futenma to northern Okinawa, which is seen as part of a more general devaluing of the alliance as a whole. The visit of Democratic Party of Japan kingpin Ichiro Ozawa to Beijing with several hundred businessmen and politicians in tow and Ozawa's push to get visiting Vice-President (and heir apparent) Xi Jinping a meeting with the emperor in Tokyo at short notice - a violation of protocol - are the pointed counterpoints to growing antagonism with Washington. Hatoyama's call for an East Asian community that excludes the US is the final piece of evidence in the case for a shift in the global balance of power - advantage Beijing!

Not exactly. Yes, the world is changing. Asia is assuming a more prominent role in the global economy. Thus far, its political influence has lagged and the desire to fix that is driving many - but not all - policy decisions in regional capitals. The creation of an East Asia Community is one expression of that desire. Yes, China is playing, and will play, a key role in that process and in any resulting community. And, yes, Japan is debating its place in the region and the world, and that debate has taken on new intensity in the wake of changes since the end of the cold war.

But once again, that isn't the whole story. China is rising, but there are real limits to its influence, strength and allure. Economic growth is creating unprecedented strains in society and it isn't clear how the political system will cope - much less deliver on expectations of rising prosperity (SEHK: 0803, announcements, news) . China is a big presence in the region, but Asian governments have little faith or confidence in Beijing. Beijing is a stalwart defender of the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs, but it has shown little inclination to provide the international public goods - security and stability - that have made Asian prosperity possible. Japan is debating national identity - but that discussion has been going on since the Meiji Restoration. Governments in Tokyo have always been tugged between East and West and compromises have been made, modified and discarded since the country discarded the isolationism of the shogun era. That is exactly what any country should do as internal and external circumstances change.

And while rapprochement between Tokyo and Beijing is a good thing - the region's two leading powers should be on good terms and no regional community is possible without some form of reconciliation - there are fundamental conflicts of interest, values and perspective that limit those countries' room for diplomatic manoeuvre. It is telling that, despite the "new look" in Tokyo, the two countries had one of their periodic spats over disputed territory in the East China Sea earlier this year.

Similarly, Japan's call for respect and equality in the US-Japan relationship is not new. Every Tokyo government has chaffed at being the "junior partner" - what ally doesn't? Significantly, public support in Japan for the alliance is at historically high levels.

And this DPJ administration, like other governments in the region, looks to the US to provide regional security and stability. Washington's power may be diminished, but it remains an integral part of the Asian order. It provides international public goods to the Asia-Pacific region. It is the trusted "great power". Washington remains a key partner as Asia - and the world - undergoes a transformative period. We must prepare for those transitions, but we shouldn't be scared of them.

Brad Glosserman is executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. Distributed by Pacific Forum CSIS


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Smear campaign
Western media is painting a grossly misleading picture of Chinese investment in Africa

Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong
Feb 12, 2010           
     
      

  



International media have reported up a storm on the recent surge in China-Africa links. They invoke a theme familiar from the past two centuries of colonialism and cold war: Africa is beset by poverty and ignorance, caused by ruthless and corrupt rulers. Westerners are trying to bring them to book and instil order on the continent, but other forces, in this case Chinese interlopers, are making that difficult. The facts on the ground show China's engagement in Africa has been more positive than this discourse claims. The Chinese are getting bad press in the West because they are from a country that is not liberal, democratic or white, yet are effectively competing with those who are - to the point that some Africans see Chinese development activities as providing a model.

The Chinese, it is said, are in Africa only for natural resources, to feed China's industry and huge population. To exploit the continent, they provide loans and aid to rogue regimes. They worsen the plight of Africans by dumping cheap, shoddy products in their markets and ruin local industry. Chinese investors pay Africans a pittance, in contrast to more ethical Western firms. China can only be an obstacle to Africa's development.

It's an exciting tale but, alas, the media has it all wrong. It's not mainly China that impairs Africa's development, but a world system of neo-liberal capitalism, based on privatisation, trade liberalisation and reduced social spending, into which China is now partly integrated. As part of the same world system, China and the West have many activities in common in Africa, but there are also some distinctly Chinese trade and investment practices, and these are often more appealing to Africans.

China-Africa trade was US$3 billion in 1995, but US$107 billion in 2008. That's still only 4 per cent of China's world trade. Yet, it makes China Africa's second-largest trading partner and trade is balanced in Africa's favour. On imports from Africa, the China-in-Africa media discourse focuses overwhelmingly on oil. It's often alleged that Chinese demand perpetuates Africa's reliance on petroleum exports, at the expense of growth in more labour-intensive industries, such as agribusiness and manufacturing.

Most of what China buys from Africa is indeed oil (62 per cent) and ores and metals (17 per cent) but, in 2008, oil was 88 per cent of US imports from Africa and minerals made up most of the rest. China's investment in oil production in Africa equals only 8 per cent of that of Western multinationals and 3 per cent of all investment in African oil. China received 9 per cent of Africa's oil exports, but Europe and the US each took 33 per cent. China also couples oil acquisition with low- or no-interest loans to build the infrastructure Africa needs. For 2006-2013, China lent or will lend US$28 billion to Africa for infrastructure and as trade credit. There is also less scope for corruption with China's loans for infrastructure projects - often built by Chinese firms paid directly by Beijing - than with the all-purpose aid Western sources provide African governments.

The focus of the China-in-Africa discourse on China's exports is almost wholly on basic consumer items and their alleged negative consequences. Chinese goods are held responsible for the decline in Africa's textile and clothing industry. But when Chinese goods first came en masse, in about 2000, Africa's textile and clothing industry was already decimated by the international financial institutions' forced trade liberalisation of the 1980s and 1990s, which opened the market to second-hand and new clothing from developed countries. The fact is that Chinese goods are much cheaper than imports from other countries, as well as locally produced goods that are made costly by poor infrastructure, pricey utilities and corruption. A British government study found that Chinese exports to Africa mainly displace developed country exports.

China's stock of investments in Africa rose from US$49 million in 1990 to US$7.8 billion in 2008. Total foreign direct investment in Africa in 2007 was US$36 billion, with most of it from the European Union, US and South Africa. There are about 1,000 significant Chinese enterprises in Africa, but the media reports focus only on investment in extractive industries, particularly on one investment, the Chambishi copper mine in Zambia.

Conditions at the Chambishi mine, with its 2,200 employees, have indeed been deplorable. But, Chambishi is not the only mine where conditions are highly oppressive, as the many strikes at Western and white South African mines show. Both Chinese and Western firms in Africa have oppressive conditions, but Western firms are more profitable. In contrast to Western investments, many Chinese enterprises share profits with Africans.

China is presented as "indifferent to Africa's authoritarian despots, as it courts the continent for energy and minerals", as a leading British journalist put it. But the US and France support most despots in Africa, providing them with military assistance and legitimacy. The West is also implicated in the trade in money and trade in people. Some 40 per cent of Africa's private wealth has been sent overseas. London and Zurich, not Beijing, receive these fruits of capital flight and tax evasion.

The China-in-Africa discourse lacks a comparative approach and reflects Western elites' perception of their national interests and moral superiority. It fails to question Western government rhetoric about "aiding African development" and "promoting African democracy". At the same time, they seize on any example of supposed exploitation by Chinese in Africa.

Many Africans - and some Westerners - question the binary view of a new Western "civilising mission" versus the actions of "amoral" Chinese. They are increasingly rejecting a discourse that draws attention away from Africa's systemic problems of exploitation and human rights and towards blaming Chinese, not for what they actually do in Africa, but for being the newly perceived strategic competitor of the West.

Barry Sautman is a political scientist and lawyer at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. Yan Hairong is an anthropologist at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online.

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Time for real science to set the record straight


Thomas Friedman
Feb 18, 2010           
     
      

  



Of the festivals of nonsense that periodically overtake US politics, surely the silliest is the argument that, because Washington is having a particularly snowy winter, it proves that climate change is a hoax and, therefore, we need not bother with all this stuff like renewable energy, solar panels and carbon taxes. Just drill, baby, drill.

The climate-science community is not blameless. It knew it was up against formidable forces - from the oil and coal companies that finance the studies sceptical of climate change, to conservatives who hate anything that will lead to more government regulations. So, climate experts can't leave themselves vulnerable by citing non-peer-reviewed research or not responding to legitimate questions.

Although a mountain of research from multiple institutions supports the reality of climate change, the public has grown uneasy. What's real? In my view, the climate-science community should convene its top experts and produce a simple 50-page report. They could call it "What We Know", summarising everything in language that a sixth grader could understand, with unimpeachable peer-reviewed footnotes.

At the same time, they should add a summary of all the errors and wild exaggerations made by the climate sceptics - and where they get their funding.

Here are the points I'd like to stress. First, avoid the term "global warming". I'd say "global weirding", because that is what really happens as global temperatures rise and the climate changes. The weather gets weird. The hots are expected to get hotter, the wets wetter, the dries drier and the most violent storms more numerous.

Second, historically, we know that the climate has warmed and cooled slowly. What the current debate is about is whether humans are rapidly exacerbating nature's natural warming cycles in ways that lead to dangerous disruptions.

Third, those who favour taking action are saying: "Because the warming humans are doing is irreversible and potentially catastrophic, let's buy insurance by investing in renewable energy, energy efficiency and mass transit." This insurance will also make us richer and more secure - the US will import less oil, invent and export more clean-tech products, spend fewer dollars buying oil and, most importantly, diminish the dollars that are sustaining petro-dictators who indirectly fund terrorists and the schools that nurture them.

Fourth, even if climate change proves less catastrophic than some fear, in a world that is forecast to grow from 6.7 billion to 9.2 billion people by 2050, demand for renewable energy and clean water will soar. Obviously it will be the next great global industry.

China, of course, understands that, which is why it is investing heavily in clean-tech, efficiency and high-speed rail. I suspect China is quietly laughing at the US right now. And Iran, Russia, Venezuela and the Opec gang are high-fiving each other. Nothing better serves their interests than to see Americans confused about climate change and, so, less inclined to move towards clean-tech - and more certain to remain addicted to oil.

Thomas L. Friedman is a New York Times columnist


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Age is no barrier
Forcing early retirement on able and experienced workers leaves Hong Kong society worse off

Mike Rowse
Feb 22, 2010           
     
      

  



It's a good job Sir Alex Ferguson is not manager of the Hong Kong government's football team, or he would have been forced to retire nine years ago when he reached his 60th birthday. Instead, he has been free during the last decade to help Manchester United go on winning trophies, including the Champions League and three consecutive premiership titles, with his team fighting hard this season for what would be an unprecedented fourth.

Why does our society insist on consigning fit and well performers at the top of their game to the scrap heap?

And should we continue to do so when the evidence all around us is that this is unnecessary and indeed socially and economically counterproductive?

The argument for raising the retirement age to 65, or even scrapping it altogether, is overwhelming. So why are we stuck in our present situation?

The answer is a combination of history and inertia.

Not so long ago, the standard retirement age for civil servants was 55, applications to retire early at 50 were readily granted and even retirement at 45 was possible if there were special circumstances. These numbers came from an era when terms and conditions were largely geared to serving the interests of expatriates who dominated the senior ranks of the civil service. Before air conditioning became widespread, and while shorts and long socks (or safari suits) were standard dress, it was felt life in the tropics was especially energy-sapping and hence worthy of generous retirement arrangements.

Even the increase of the retirement age to 60, when it came, needs to be compared to average life expectancy which now stands at about 79 for men and well over 80 for women. So our society is planning for the average person to spend 20 or more years being economically inactive.

From the perspective of the individual, the consequences of spending decades without income can be devastating. Gradually, savings accumulated over a working career of 40 years or so disappear, which could leave the retiree in poverty or as a serious burden on his family (or the community at large, of which more later). While the financial implications are serious enough, the effect on the morale of the person can be even grimmer. For most people, their job is an integral part of who they are. It helps define them, gives them a sense of purpose. The prospect of an enforced early retirement with inactivity stretching over the horizon often results in a collapse of their spirit and can even result in early death (the so-called "gold watch" syndrome).

Of course, some of the effects of this can be softened by courses preparing people for retirement and, at some point, everyone does have to stop working. So in a sense, raising the retirement age only postpones the problem rather than removes it altogether. But it is surely easier to slip into graceful retirement - preferably with an interim stage involving part-time work - when one's mind and body are sending unmistakable signals that enough is enough.

From society's point of view, early retirement is an extraordinary waste of expertise. People educated at great expense and sharpened by years of hard-won experience are shoved aside when they still have much to offer. Moreover, with the deterioration of family values that seems to be an inevitable part of the switch from rural to urban living, the community now has a tendency to look to the government to provide support for the elderly. Where once it was common for three or even four generations to live under one roof, now this is exceptional and the nuclear family has become the norm.

Governments everywhere are struggling to cope with the financial consequences of people hammering on the door for old-age pensions set high enough to support independent living. At this point, it is worth pointing out that when old-age pensions were first introduced with 65 set as the qualifying age in Britain, the average life expectancy was considerably lower than this - somewhere in the mid-50s.

It has just been reported that Shanghai is on the verge of raising the retirement age. An increase is an inevitable part of any package to rescue the American social security system.

In addition to the direct consequences, there are also indirect ones. Already there are concessionary fares on public transport for those aged 65 (or 60 on Citybus). How long before there is pressure to lower the qualifying limit?

In other words, by setting the benchmark at 60 for retirement, we lend subtle support to the idea of dependency and subsidies. We should instead be encouraging self-sufficiency for as long as possible. There are many other aspects of this subject that there is no room to cover here. But, suffice to say, the conclusion is clear: the Hong Kong government should take the lead and announce immediately that in principle it has decided to move the normal retirement age to 65 and will be making arrangements for early implementation.

Does it have the courage to do so, or is this another one for the overflowing "too difficult" basket?

Mike Rowse is a retired civil servant and an adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong


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